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Abstract
A hundred years ago, pre-puberty marriage for girls was the norm among South
Indian Tamil Brahmans, and Brahman girls received little or no education. By
the 1940s, child marriage had largely ended and girls’ education was improving
gradually. Today, girls’ educational standards more or less match that of boys’,
and many Brahman women are also employed outside the home. In relation to
marriage and education in particular, the position of women has greatly improved,
which is regarded by Tamil Brahmans themselves as a sign of their modern,
educated, professional, middle-class status, whereas extreme gender inequality
formerly indicated their traditional, high-caste status. This paper examines how
female marriage, education, and employment are interrelated and how they
have changed among Tamil Brahmans, particularly in the Eighteen-Village
Vattima subcaste, which continued child marriage until the 1970s. Among
Tamil Brahmans, as both women and men recognize, a real reduction in gender
inequality has occurred. Moreover, Brahman men have more readily ceded status
to Brahman women than Brahmans together have to non-Brahmans, so that
there is a striking contrast today between persisting ideas of caste superiority
and diminishing gender inequality.
Gender hierarchy has been a crucial component of Indian society
since ancient times. A famous verse in The Laws of Manu (5.148),
∗ For useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, we thank Mukulika
Banerjee, Henrike Donner, Johnny Parry, Mytheli Sreenivas, and Sylvia Vatuk, as
well as participants at a workshop convened by Peter van der Veer at the Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen. We also thank the
Economic and Social Research Council which has supported our research. Although
this paper was written by C. J. Fuller, it has been discussed extensively with Haripriya
Narasimhan and it represents our joint views.
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written about 2,000 years ago by Brahman lawgivers, declares that:
‘In childhood a woman should be under her father’s control, in
youth under her husband’s, and when her husband is dead, under
her sons’. She should not have independence.’1 Manu, of course, is
normative prescription, not sociological description, but the inferiority
and subordination of women within the family and beyond it have long
been key features of hierarchical society and culture among Hindus
(and other communities) in India; in many contexts, they still are.
In general, though, gender inequality was, and is, more pronounced
among high castes. Hence the conduct of daughters, wives, mothers,
and widows is most severely constrained by purity and pollution rules,
seclusion practices, moral rigidity, and obsessive control of female
sexuality among Brahmans and other high-ranking castes. Low-caste
women, by contrast, are more relaxed about purity, commonly work
outside the home so they cannot be secluded, are less influenced by
Brahmanical norms, and are often less subject to male authority,
although these features themselves contribute to the low status of
their families and communities.
Carol Mukhopadhyay and Susan Seymour examine the interconnec-
tion between caste and gender hierarchies by identifying a distinctive
‘patrifocal family structure and ideology’ made up of a series of linked
features: notably, emphasis on the family’s importance as opposed
to the individual’s; patrilineal descent and inheritance; gender-
differentiated roles and responsibilities; male authority; strong control
of female sexuality and reproduction; arranged marriage, especially
for girls at a young age; and an ideological stress on female chastity,
obedience, modesty, and allied virtues. Mukhopadhyay and Seymour
also discuss the variable impact of modern female education on this
patrifocal complex. They specifically note that ‘ironically. . . elite,
upper-status women’ from the ‘most prototypically patrifocal’ groups
‘have achieved the most educationally and. . . appear to be challenging
traditional patrifocal structures and ideology’, although they also ask
whether this apparent challenge will merely modify the old complex,
rather than undermine it.2
1 Wendy Doniger and Brian K. Smith (trans.), The Laws of Manu (London: Penguin,
1991), p. 115.
2 Carol C. Mukhopadhyay and Susan Seymour, ‘Introduction and Theoretical
Overview’, in Carol C. Mukhopadhyay and Susan Seymour (eds), Women, Education,
and Family Structure in India (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1994), pp. 3–4, 25.
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The Tamil Brahmans: introductory remarks
In the Conclusion to this paper, we shall return to Mukhopadhyay
and Seymour’s question because it is highly pertinent to the case of
Tamil Brahmans, traditionally the highest-status caste in Tamilnadu,
South India. Brahmans, mostly Tamil-speaking, make up no more
than 2.5 per cent of Tamilnadu’s population. Since the nineteenth
century, Brahmans have migrated in large numbers from villages
to towns and cities, as they have entered new fields of modern,
professional employment, from administration and law to engineering
and information technology (IT). Many Brahmans have also moved
from Tamilnadu to other parts of India and, in recent decades, to
foreign countries. By the end of the twentieth century, an old elite
of Brahman landlords had been transformed into a predominantly
urban, middle-class group with a significant presence across India and
overseas.3
A hundred years ago, gender hierarchy was extreme among Tamil
Brahmans and markedly more so than among non-Brahman groups
in the region. A diacritical aspect of this hierarchy was pre-puberty
marriage for girls, which in Tamilnadu was largely confined to
Brahmans. Brahman girls received little or no education at that time.
This was the position not only in old-fashioned rural families, but also
in those headed by the educated, English-speaking, professional men
who formed the new urban middle class of colonial Madras. As Nita
Kumar comments, members of this ‘new intelligentsia’ were usually
as conservative as their fathers, who ‘typically honoured caste and
sectarian rules, practised gender and age hierarchies, and believed in
child marriage’.4 Thus Tamil Brahman girls—including the daughters
of even high-ranking administrators and lawyers in Madras city—were
normally married before puberty and mostly received only minimal
education.
By the mid-twentieth century, child marriage had largely ended
and the standard of girls’ education was improving, so that more
and more of them, like their brothers, completed their schooling and
3 C. J. Fuller and Haripriya Narasimhan, ‘From Landlords to Software Engineers:
Migration and Urbanization among Tamil Brahmans’, Comparative Studies in Society
and History, 50 (1) 2008a, pp. 170–96; C. J. Fuller, ‘The Modern Transformation of
an Old Elite: The Case of the Tamil Brahmans’, in Isabelle Clark-Decès (ed.), A
Companion to the Anthropology of India (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011).
4 Nita Kumar, The Politics of Gender, Community, and Modernity: Essays on Education in
India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 131.
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even went to college. By then, too, the Tamil Brahmans were clearly
becoming a predominantly urban, middle-class caste. By the end of
the twentieth century, Brahman girls’ educational standards more
or less matched that of boys’, and are nowadays higher overall than
those of non-Brahman girls. Most Brahman girls today—like other
middle-class girls in India—marry in their twenties after finishing
their education. Many Brahman women are also employed outside
the home, which was previously uncommon. In relation to marriage
and education in particular, therefore, the position of Tamil Brahman
women has greatly improved during the last hundred years or so. That
improvement is regarded today, at least by Brahmans themselves, as
one sign of their collective status as a modern, educated, professional,
middle-class elite, whereas previously conformity to Manu’s norms was
indicative of their traditional, high-caste status.
In tracing the modern history of Tamil Brahman women, the end
of pre-puberty marriage and the associated improvement in female
education were crucial developments. Partly because the majority of
Tamil Brahmans had given up child marriage by the 1940s, there is
no ethnographic material about it. Apart from general survey data,
most of the available evidence concerns members of the urban elite.
Quite possibly—for example, in newspapers and magazines of the
kind studied by Mytheli Sreenivas5—there might be evidence about
ordinary Brahmans and their attitudes to child marriage and girls’
education, but as yet it has not been uncovered by historians. However,
in one Tamil Brahman subcaste—the Eighteen-Village Vattimas—
child marriage continued until the 1970s, so that many older Vattima
women can talk about the custom from personal experience. The
Vattimas, among whom we have conducted fieldwork, have been
unusually conservative in several respects, not only in relation to
marriage. Thus Vattima men moved to towns and cities for education
and employment later than other Brahmans of comparable economic
standing, and Vattima landlords tended to stay in their villages until
the 1960s or 1970s, two or three decades longer than many other
Brahman landlords.6 The Eighteen-Village Vattimas are also a fairly
small subcaste with a very high rate of endogamous marriage, so
5 Mytheli Sreenivas, Wives, Widows, and Concubines: The Conjugal Family Ideal in
Colonial India (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), Chapter 4.
6 Fuller and Narasimhan, ‘From Landlords to Software Engineers’, pp. 177–78.
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that its members are linked by dense kinship networks that tend to
encourage social conformity.7
The ethnographic data in this paper mainly concern the
Vattimas, but we discuss them against the historical background
of Tamil Brahmans collectively. We also look at how the difference
between Vattima women and other Brahman women has practically
disappeared in very recent times. Simply generalizing from the
Vattimas to the rest of their caste would obviously be unwarranted;
nonetheless, our data show in some detail how marriage, education,
and employment for women were and are interconnected in a
particular subcaste and, extrapolated carefully, they also help to clarify
change among Tamil Brahmans as a whole.
Child marriage and social reform
According to Brahmanical tradition, marriage is a kanyadana—a ‘gift
of a virgin’ who is ritually pure—and parents failing to marry their
daughters before the onset of ‘polluting’ menstruation commit a
grave sin. On this matter, scriptural authorities were never entirely
unanimous, but pre-puberty marriage for Brahman girls became
widespread from the sixth or seventh centuries.8 In Tamilnadu, unlike
many other regions of India, pre-puberty marriage was mainly confined
to Brahmans. A girl went to live with her husband and the marriage
was consummated after she came of age.
In the late nineteenth century, social reformers throughout India
began to campaign against child marriage. In1891, the Age of Consent
Act became law in British India and raised the age of consent for sexual
intercourse from 10 to 12 to protect young girls from older husbands
(or other men). In the 1920s, the age of consent was reconsidered
and the outcome was the Child Marriage Restraint Act, popularly
known as the Sarda Act after its principal sponsor. This Act, which
was passed in 1929 and came into force in 1930, fixed the minimum
age for marriage at 14 for girls and 18 for boys.
7 C. J. Fuller and Haripriya Narasimhan, ‘Companionate Marriage in India: The
Changing Marriage System in a Middle-class Brahman Subcaste’, Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute (n.s.), 14 (4) 2008b, pp. 736–54, especially pp. 736–37, 742–
43.
8 P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute, 1974 [1941]), Vol. 2, p. 445.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 11 Jan 2013 IP address: 85.210.5.134
58 C . J . F U L L E R A N D H A R I P R I Y A N A R A S I M H A N
In the debates about reform, the primary issue was the health and
welfare of girls who became wives when they were very young, and one
important consideration was their education or lack of it. Another issue
was the harsh fate of child widows, who were not allowed to remarry
and were therefore condemned to remain inauspicious celibates for
life. Yet there was also a lot of argument over Indian ‘public opinion’,
especially about whether ordinary people would accept reform, as
well as other questions about, for example, the scriptural veracity
of Brahman orthodoxy. Particularly contentious was the question of
how reform enacted by a colonial government would affect the honour
of the nation and its women.9
Prior to the 1920s, nearly all public debate over reform was
conducted by men and, as many writers have commented, they were
often really arguing about colonialism and nationalism, or tradition
and modernity, not about the condition of the women actually living
in their country. Controversy over the ‘woman question’, in which
marriage and female education were at the forefront, first arose in the
mid-nineteenth century, especially in Bengal. Middle-class nationalist
reformers—almost all belonging to the upper castes—overwhelmingly
favoured improved education for girls, mainly to make them better
wives and mothers, but reform was coloured by deep anxiety. As Sanjay
Seth puts it: ‘The middle-class and nationalist project was to educate
women so that they would become modern and yet able to represent
Indianness; the anxiety that was the underside of this project was the
fear that Indianness might be effaced by the pursuit of modernity.’10 It
was vital that Indians, not foreign overlords, should control this project
9 A very small selection from the sizeable historical literature on these topics,
mostly about the colonial period, includes: Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and
its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1993), Chapters 6–7; Geraldine H. Forbes, ‘Women and Modernity:
The Issue of Child Marriage in India’, Women’s Studies International Quarterly, 2
(4) 1979, pp. 407–19; Geraldine H. Forbes, Women in Modern India (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Kumar, The Politics of Gender, Chapters 5–7;
Tanika Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism
(New Delhi: Permanent Black,2001); Sanjay Seth, Subject Lessons: The Western Education
of Colonial India (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2007); Mrinalini
Sinha, Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of an Empire (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006), Chapter 4. For Madras, see: Sita Anantha
Raman, Getting Girls to School: Social Reform in the Tamil Districts, 1870–1930 (Calcutta:
Stree, 1996); Sreenivas, Wives, Widows, and Concubines; R. Suntharalingam, Politics and
Nationalist Awakening in South India, 1852–1891 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1974), Chapter 7.
10 Seth, Subject Lessons, p. 142.
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to modernize women, which affected the ‘inner’ spiritual domain
of ‘essential’ Indian values, as opposed to the ‘external’ material
domain.11 Marriage, belonging to the inner domain, was a serious
matter for reformers, but they disagreed about it: progressive liberals
opposed child marriage, which precluded the emergence of modern
educated women, whereas traditionalist conservatives defended the
custom as part of true Indian culture and a guarantor of female purity
and virtue.
In the Madras Presidency (which incorporated modern Tamilnadu),
all the issues about child marriage reform were debated at one time
or another. Argument about the age of consent in the late nineteenth
century was less vociferous than in Bengal. It was also mainly confined
to Brahmans, but it quickly polarized opinion within Madras’s elite,
most of them Brahman educated professionals. A few men supported
reform, but others vehemently opposed it, and yet others either
remained silent or expressed reservations about using legislation to
reform child marriage. The controversy in Madras sharpened the
division between progressives and traditionalists within the nationalist
movement, but specifically, too, it dispelled the popular myth that
the majority of ‘the Western-educated class were allies in the cause
of social reform’.12 Tamil Brahmans in particular mostly opposed
measures that might undermine their caste superiority within South
Indian society, for, as Charles Heimsath observed, ‘social innovation by
Madras Brahmins. . . could mean the extinction of the privileges which
separated them, and their entire families, from the benighted lower
orders’.13 Moreover, in M. S. S. Pandian’s words, the Tamil Brahman
elite ‘claimed Brahminical culture as the essence of the nation’,
while also dominating the material domain through their power in
the colonial system.14 Hence Chatterjee’s inner-outer dichotomy was
significantly modified in Madras by the opposition among Brahmans
and non-Brahmans, which steadily strengthened during the twentieth
century.15
11 Seth, Subject Lessons, pp. 135–36; see also Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments,
p. 6, Chapters 6–7.
12 Suntharalingam, Politics and Nationalist Awakening, p. 326.
13 Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 111–12.
14 M. S. S. Pandian, Brahmin and Non-Brahmin: Genealogies of the Tamil Political Present
(Delhi: Permanent Black, 2007), p. 62.
15 See Sreenivas, Wives, Widows, and Concubines, pp. 69–70, 92–93.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 11 Jan 2013 IP address: 85.210.5.134
60 C . J . F U L L E R A N D H A R I P R I Y A N A R A S I M H A N
The debate about the age of consent and child marriage in advance
of the Sarda Act occurred in a different political climate from
earlier debates. In her examination of the Act and its accompanying
controversy, Mrinalini Sinha argues that the most significant novel
feature was probably ‘the mobilization of a collective identity for and
by women in the public realm’. Female voices were heard, as they
had not been earlier, and women campaigning for reform claimed—
more or less convincingly—to represent the views of all women,
irrespective of caste or community. By the early twentieth century, too,
marriage ‘had become an especially dense site for indigenous reformist
public concerns’ and there was widespread nationalist support for
modern marriage reform, even if it did interfere with supposedly
essential Indian values.16 Conservative Hindu hostility to the Sarda
Act was strongest in Bengal and Madras;17 in Madras, although some
liberal Tamil Brahmans supported the Bill, much of the fiercest
opposition came from Brahmans, including Congress supporters and
nationalists.18 Thus, for example, in the Indian Legislative Assembly
in 1929, the Sarda Act was most strenuously opposed by two Brahman
members from Madras.19 The arguments against reform resembled
those that had made against the Age of Consent Act, but by the
1920s nationalist politics in Madras had been changed by the non-
Brahman Justice Party, which had emerged to oppose the Brahman-
dominated Congress. As Sreenivas explains, there was now a non-
Brahman, Dravidian nationalist debate about marriage, as well as an
Indian nationalist one.20 Brahmans did not care how non-Brahmans
chose to marry, but the political changes meant that, unlike 40 years
earlier, the Tamil Brahman legislators’ ‘rather desperate defense of
pre-puberty marriage had lost its claims to nationalist authority’, so
that they could not block the Sarda Act.21 On paper at least, the new
16 Sinha, Specters of Mother India, p. 154.
17 Sinha, Specters of Mother India, pp. 171–72, 181–82.
18 Sreenivas, Wives, Widows, and Concubines, p. 75.
19 M. K. Acharya and M. S. Sesha Ayyangar spoke repeatedly and lengthily against
the Bill in September 1929; see Legislative Assembly Debates (Official Report), 4: 240,
262, 887; 5: 1056, 1130, 1284. Acharya was a member of the Tamil Nadu Congress
Committee (see Pandian, Brahmin and Non-Brahmin, p. 92).
20 Sreenivas, Wives, Widows, and Concubines, Chapter 3.
21 Sreenivas, Wives, Widows, and Concubines, p. 77. For radical non-Brahman views
on marriage, see Sarah Hodges, ‘Revolutionary Family Life and the Self Respect
Movement in Tamil South India, 1926–49’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 39 (2)
2005, pp. 251–77.
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Act prohibited most pre-puberty marriages, so that an ostensibly vital
and cherished custom of Tamil Brahmans was eradicated.
Concurrent with the debate about child marriage—and often
involving the same Tamil Brahman protagonists—was another about
joint-family reform, which also had to do with the position of women.
Many educated professionals, both Brahman and non-Brahman,
advocated legal reform to permit men to retain individually acquired
property and to guarantee the property rights of their conjugal families
ahead of their joint families. The new laws, which were enacted in the
1930s, scarcely improved female property rights, however; instead,
as Sreenivas and Eleanor Newbigin show, they tended to reinforce
women’s dependence on fathers and husbands in a modified form of
patriarchy.22 Thus even reformers opposed to child marriage often
supported ‘traditional’ female dependency, as indeed the majority of
ordinary Tamil Brahmans of both sexes and all classes most probably
did as well.
In any case, by 1929 more Tamil Brahmans probably favoured
marriage reform than had been the case a generation earlier
and more were concerned with improving the welfare of girls.23
Sister Subbalakshmi (1886–1969), the first notable Brahman women
reformer in Madras, did much to change attitudes.24 Subbalakshmi
was married in 1898 when she was 11, and was widowed soon
afterwards. Her unconventional parents and widowed aunt decided
that Subbalakshmi should resume her education, instead of being
secluded as an inauspicious widow, and in 1911 she became one of the
first women to graduate from Madras University. After graduating,
Subbalakshmi—who never remarried—dedicated herself to helping
other young Brahman widows by establishing a home, supported
by the government, where they were educated and then trained as
teachers. When the government opened a teachers’ training college
for women in 1922, Subbalakshmi became its principal and she
eventually became a leading educationalist in South India. The
welfare of Brahman child widows was therefore not the sole focus
of Subbalakshmi’s life’s work, but it was probably the most important
22 Mytheli Sreenivas, ‘Conjugality and Capital: Gender, Families, and Property
under Colonial Law in India’, Journal of Asian Studies, 63 (4) 2004, pp. 937–60; Eleanor
Newbigin, ‘A Post-colonial Patriarchy? Representing Family in the Indian Nation-
state’, Modern Asian Studies, 44 (1) 2010, pp. 121–44.
23 Raman, Getting Girls to School, pp. 251–54.
24 On Sister Subbalakshmi, see Monica Felton, A Child Widow’s Story (London:
Gollancz, 1966). Forbes, Women in Modern India, pp. 57–60.
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for a former child widow who exemplified the role widows played in
pioneering social reform and girls’ education.25 Subbalakshmi, though
restrained by her official position, also campaigned in support of the
Child Marriage Restraint Act.26
Subbalakshmi’s school for widows did admit a few other girls and its
evident success encouraged Brahman parents to think about educating
their daughters.27 Moreover, as Sita Anantha Raman comments,
Subbalakshmi’s ‘success in freeing widows like herself from mental
torpor was a more powerful argument for liberalism than vociferous
debate’.28 Ameliorating the lives of widows and improving female
education were increasingly seen as closely related issues. As time
passed, Subbalakshmi gained the support of other powerful liberals
in Madras—mostly men and most (but not all) Brahmans. They also
favoured better education for all girls, which would also encourage the
postponement of marriage, because girls were normally withdrawn
from school after marriage or, at the latest, when they reached
menarche. In reality, even in elite circles in Madras where support
for girls’ education was most vocal, some of it was probably rhetorical
and did little to dispel the social pressure on parents to marry off
their daughters before puberty in accordance with ‘respectable’ norms.
Thus an elderly Brahman widow told us in 2010 that she was married
aged ten, one month before the Sarda Act came into force in 1930. Her
father, an engineer, objected to the marriage, but he was overruled by
senior relatives, including his own father, who retorted that he (the
girl’s father) had married his wife, a High Court judge’s daughter
from one of Madras city’s most illustrious families, when she was only
eight. The girl (our informant) was then married to a subordinate
judge’s son, a law student at the time, although her father did flout
convention by allowing her to stay at school after the wedding. She
came of age at 13 and went to her husband’s house a year later.
As soon as it was passed, the Sarda Act’s weaknesses were obvious to
both supporters and opponents. Its provisions were ‘so toothless. . . as
to have little practical effect’ and its first result was actually ‘a drastic
spate of child marriages’ immediately before the law came into force.29
25 See Kumar, The Politics of Gender, pp. 148–50; Raman, Getting Girls to School,
pp. 107–10.
26 Felton, A Child Widow’s Story, pp. 152–64; Forbes, Women in Modern India,
pp. 59–60; Sinha, Specters of Mother India, p. 174.
27 Felton, A Child Widow’s Story, pp. 131–32.
28 Raman, Getting Girls to School, p. 189.
29 Sinha, Specters of Mother India, p. 152.
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One of these has just been described, and in Madras there were many
more like it in the ‘rush’ to get girls married, as the 1931 census
reveals.30 On the other hand, it is also noteworthy that even though
pre-puberty marriage was the ideal norm among Tamil Brahmans, it
was far from universal. The 1911 and 1921 censuses contain data on
the civil condition of Tamil Brahmans in Madras and Tanjore districts,
and the 1931 census on all Tamil Brahmans in Madras Presidency.31
In 1911, 80.0 per cent of girls in the 12–15 age cohort were married
or widowed, but in 1921 the proportion had fallen to 60.5 per cent,
so that the frequency of child marriage was declining and a large
minority of girls reached 14 without being married. By 1931, 84.1
per cent of girls in the 7–13 age cohort, as well as 13.1 per cent in
the 14–16 cohort, were recorded as being unmarried. Unfortunately,
developments after 1931 cannot be traced, because the relevant data
were not provided by subsequent censuses.
Obviously, people may have misled the census enumerators to
disguise child marriages; the 1931 figures, following the Sarda Act,
look particularly unreliable. Furthermore, statistics on child marriage
tell us little about attitudes towards it, although the downward trend
after 1911 suggests declining popularity. Yet it is also salient that
the majority of post-puberty marriages were almost certainly not
occurring in elite progressive families, but in poor families who were
unable to pay bountiful dowries and wedding expenses. Sometimes,
too, desperate parents would try to pass girls off as pre-pubertal, even
though they had started to menstruate. For poor Brahmans especially,
post-puberty marriage was usually a misfortune, not a progressive
choice.
In truth, though, there is next to no evidence available about ‘public
opinion’ concerning child marriage among ordinary Tamil Brahmans
in the early twentieth century, notwithstanding the claims made by
both sides in the Sarda Act debate.32 However, the scanty information
we have collected, some of it from elderly Brahman informants,
suggests that by the late1940s child marriage had largely disappeared.
Maybe the new law, albeit ineffectual, did have an ‘educational
30 Census of India 1931, Vol. XIV, Madras, pt. 1, Report, p. 340.
31 Census of India 1911, Vol. XII, Madras, pt. 2, Table XIV, p. 124; Census of India
1921, Vol. XIII, Madras, pt. 2, Table XIV, p. 126; Census of India 1931, Vol. XIV,
Madras, pt. 2, Table VII, pp. 98–99. Unlike the clear age cohorts used in the 1931
census, those in the earlier censuses are ambiguous, therefore direct comparison of
the figures is impossible.
32 See Sinha, Specters of Mother India, p. 194.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 11 Jan 2013 IP address: 85.210.5.134
64 C . J . F U L L E R A N D H A R I P R I Y A N A R A S I M H A N
impact’ among Tamil Brahmans.33 Or maybe the debate surrounding
it changed some conservative minds, affected by growing concern for
the welfare of child brides and especially widows, as well as increasing
support for girls’ education. The lack of census data after 1931 is
not rectified by other sources and later ethnographic studies hardly
mention child marriage. Thus C. J. Fuller briefly reports that child
marriage has not occurred among the Brahman temple priests in
Madurai since the 1940s, while E. Kathleen Gough, who did intensive
fieldwork in a Brahman village in the early 1950s and must have met
many former child brides, merely noted that ‘marriage formerly took
place before puberty but now occurs about the age of fifteen’.34 In the
final analysis, the explanation for the disappearance of pre-puberty
marriage among the mass of Tamil Brahmans is far from clear.
Vattima women’s marriage and education
In contrast with other Tamil Brahmans, pre-puberty marriage
continued among the Eighteen-Village Vattimas until the 1970s,
notwithstanding the Sarda Act. The last case on which we have
information occurred in 1973, when a boy of 18 married a girl of
12, although another one that took place in 1976 was mentioned
to us. Plainly, the Vattimas are an unusual case, but investigating
how child marriage worked and how it ended in this one subcaste is
revealing. The agraharam or Brahman quarter of Tippirajapuram, a
Vattima village near the temple town of Kumbakonam, was the main
site in which fieldwork was undertaken, although we have also visited
Vattimas in their other villages and interviewed them in Chennai and
other Indian towns and cities, as well as in the United States.35
Table 1 shows the age at marriage of Vattima women living in
Tippirajapuram in2006. All nine women aged70 or over were married
33 Sinha, Specters of Mother India, p. 152.
34 C. J. Fuller, The Renewal of the Priesthood: Modernity and Traditionalism in a South
Indian Temple (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 73; E.
Kathleen Gough, ‘Brahman Kinship in a Tamil Village’, American Anthropologist, 58
(5) 1956, pp. 826–53, especially p. 841.
35 Research was carried out among Eighteen-Village Vattima Brahmans in
Tippirajapuram from September 2005 to March 2006, in the United States in
September 2006, and in Chennai and other Indian cities (and in Tippirajapuram
again) from January to April 2007, in August 2007, from January to March 2008, and
March to April 2010. Most of the research was undertaken by Haripriya Narasimhan,
accompanied by Fuller some of the time.
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Table 1
Age at marriage of married Vattima women in Tippirajapuram.
Women by age (2006)
Age at marriage 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 ≥70 All
≤13 3 7 9 19
14–19 1 1 3 5
20–24 1 3 2 1 7
≥25 1 1 2
Total 1 4 7 12 9 33
Table 2
Age at marriage of married Vattima women in cities.
Women by age (2006)
Age at marriage 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 ≥70 All
≤13 1 1 9 4 15
14–19 2 5 10 2 1 20
20–24 2 5 2 2 1 12
≥25 1 1 1 3
Total 3 8 8 13 12 6 50
aged 13 or under in the 1930s or 1940s, but seven out of 12 women
aged 60–69 and three out of seven aged 50–59 were equally young
when they married in the 1950s and 1960s. The minority of women
aged 50 or over who married after puberty usually did so because their
parents were too poor to afford a respectable marriage. Husbands
were (and are) older than their wives, but about half the senior men
in Tippirajapuram had married before they reached 20.
Table 2 shows the age at marriage of Vattima women living
in Chennai and other Indian cities. These data were collected in
interviews, but no systematic survey was done among urban Vattimas.
Far more younger women live in cities than villages, so the age
distribution in Tables 1 and 2 differs. In the urban sample, four out
of six women aged 70 or over and nine out of 12 aged 60–69 were
married as children, so that the profile is very similar to the women
living in Tippirajapuram. On the other hand, in the 50–59 age cohort,
ten out of 13 women living in cities were married between 14 and 19,
and only one had married as a child, which reflects changes in girls’
education and hence later marriage apparent by the 1960s. The sole
child marriage of a women in her forties is the late case from 1973
mentioned above.
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Table 3
Completed education of married Vattima women in Tippirajapuram.
Women by age (2006)
Completed education 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 ≥70 All
1st–5th 1 4 6 11
6th–10th 1 6 7 2 16
12th, PUC 3 3
No data 1 1 1 3
Total 1 4 7 12 9 33
Table 4
Completed education of married Vattima women in cities.
Women by age (2006)
Completed education 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 ≥70 All
1st–5th 2 2
6th–10th 3 4 1 8
12th, PUC 2 3 2 2 9
Bachelor’s 2 3 4 5 14
Postgraduate 1 3 1 5
No data 1 3 7 1 12
Total 3 8 8 13 12 6 50
Table 3 shows that the large majority of Vattima women in
Tippirajapuram had school education only and, among women aged
60 or over, half only attended elementary school.36 Many of their
husbands, in contrast, were well educated and half of them, in all
age cohorts, obtained degrees and later worked in professional jobs.
Our data on Vattima women in the cities are incomplete, but Table 4
(covering the same women as Table 2) shows that their standards of
education have been rising. Among urban women aged 50 or over, four
had some post-secondary school education, five more have a Bachelor’s
degree and another has a higher, medical degree. (Almost without
exception, all the urban Vattima women’s husbands have degrees
or other professional qualifications.) Despite our small samples, the
36 In the Indian education system, children usually start school when they are five
years old. Primary school has five grades—first to fifth standards—and secondary
school, five more—sixth to tenth standards. Pupils successfully completing the final
grade are awarded the Secondary School Leaving Certificate (SSLC). Two more years
of study—now the eleventh and twelfth standards (otherwise known as the Pre-
University Certificate [PUC] course or the Intermediate course)—are required before
entering college or university to study for a Bachelor’s degree.
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figures in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with how our Vattima
informants perceive female education within their community, which
we will now discuss using case-studies.
Pre-puberty marriage and schooling for Vattima girls
Several elderly women brought up in Tippirajapuram described the
primary school (pallikkudam) that they attended in the 1930s or 1940s,
which was typical of those in most Vattima (and other Tamil Brahman)
villages. Lessons were held in the agraharam in a Brahman’s house,
often on its veranda (tinnai), so that these schools were called tinnai
pallikkudam.37 Both boys and girls attended the Tippirajapuram school
and most were Brahmans, although there were a few non-Brahman
pupils as well. Unlike the girls, almost all the boys would later proceed
to secondary school and many to college as well. The principal was a
local Vattima paid a salary by the government, and there were one
or two assistant teachers. Pupils of different ages and standards were
only loosely split up into classes and were often all taught together.
Reading, writing, and arithmetic in Tamil, together with basic English,
made up most of the curriculum and rote-memorization was the
primary pedagogical method. These elementary skills were regarded
as adequate for girls to become competent housewives and mothers.
In towns and a few villages, purpose-built primary schools existed in
the 1940s and earlier; after Independence, tinnai pallikkudams were
progressively replaced by schools run by local councils (panchayats) or
by private schools.
A Vattima widow born in 1919, who lives in Tippirajapuram, said
she was educated only to third standard in her native village; this
minimal schooling was common in her generation as women were
expected only to be able to read and write a simple letter. Another
widow we met in Chennai, who was born in 1922, did study until the
fifth standard but, as she put it, ‘Back then we were not allowed to
study. . . I don’t like to talk about it.’ In the preceding generation of
women born around 1900, though, many were illiterate and could at
best just sign their names.
The marital experiences of Lalitha and Sarada, two Vattima women
in Tippirajapuram who were both born in 1934, have been described
37 ‘Veranda schools’ were known as ‘pyal schools’ in Anglo-Indian administrative
terminology (see Raman, Getting Girls to School, p. ix).
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elsewhere.38 Lalitha and Sarada were both brought up in other
Vattima villages, not Tippirajapuram. Lalitha was married at 12
to a 19-year-old man, who became a landlord and accountant in
Tippirajapuram, but she did not live with him until she was 20. Sarada
was married at 7 to a boy aged 15, who grew up to be a landlord
in Tippirajapuram, and she began to live with him at 15. Lalitha
completed primary schooling in her native village; she continued into
the next year (sixth standard) until she married and left school. Her
formal education then ended, even though she only joined her husband
several years later when he had completed his college education.
Sarada also attended primary school in her native village, but after
marriage she went to a secondary school in Mayavaram, the town
near her village, where she completed the eighth standard before she
came of age and joined her husband, who had finished his secondary
schooling.
Although some women, like Lalitha, left school straight after
marriage, the general consensus among elderly Vattimas is that in
the past a girl’s education did not have to stop until the onset of
menstruation, as in Sarada’s case. As a result, how much education
most girls received depended on their age at menarche, and women
in Sarada’s generation typically left school between the fifth and
eighth standards. Thus, for instance, Mahalakshmi, now resident in
Tippirajapuram, was born in 1944 and brought up in the town of
Trichy (Tirucchirappalli); she was married at 11 to a landlord aged
19, and left school three years later when she came of age and
was in the eighth standard. Uma was born in 1936, brought up in
Tippirajapuram, and married at 11; her husband was then a 16-year-
old law student. (Uma’s mother completed only the third standard and
her grandmother was probably illiterate.) Uma attended the village
school and left at 14, but during the next three years before joining
her husband, her parents arranged private tuition for her at home,
so that she reached the ninth standard. Once she had moved to her
in-laws’ house, though, her education ceased because, leaving aside
all her domestic duties, young wives like her ‘weren’t even allowed to
come to lighted areas of the house’. An unusual case is Sridevi, born
in 1945, who was married at 11 to a schoolteacher and landlord who
was 21. Sridevi did not start to menstruate until she was 16 and lived
next door to her school in a town, which made it easier to allow her to
38 Fuller and Narasimhan, ‘Companionate Marriage in India’, pp. 738–40. In this
paper, all informants’ names are pseudonyms.
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complete the Secondary School Leaving Certificate before she went
to live with her husband at 19. Compared with other women of her
generation living in Tippirajapuram, Sridevi was fortunate.
In the 1950s and earlier, attendance at secondary school would
have required girls living in Tippirajapuram and most other villages
to travel several miles to and from a town, which was impractical
when slow bullock carts were the sole means of transport. (For village
boys, this problem was usually solved by sending them to stay with
relatives living near a school or to one with a boys’ residential hostel.)
Girls living in or close to towns, or in Vishnupuram—the one Vattima
village with a high school established in the early twentieth century—
would not have had a problem with travelling. But the fundamental
reason why nearly all married Vattima (and other Brahman) girls
had to leave school after menarche pertained to morality. No mature
married girl was permitted to risk her moral reputation through an
encounter with a male stranger—or even the rumour of one—outside
the safety of her own home, so that, apart from rare exceptions like
Sridevi, they could not be allowed to stay at school. Were a young wife
to be accused of immorality before cohabitation, her husband’s family
might refuse to accept her, and in any event the public reputations of
both her natal and affinal families would be seriously damaged.
Urban life and the improvement of Vattima girls’ education
The majority of elderly Vattima women whom we met in Chennai
and other cities were born and raised in villages, had pre-puberty
marriages, and experienced the same restricted schooling as women
in Tippirajapuram. Like the widow in Chennai quoted above, many of
these women look back on their curtailed education with regret and
even the most conservative agree that the opportunities available for
young women today are a vast improvement on the past.
In understanding how girls’ education improved, the exceptional
cases are significant. Kamala, born in 1935, is the daughter of an
eminent doctor. Kamala was married after puberty at 16 because her
father, who was employed by the Madras government, had to comply
with the Sarda Act. Kamala married a 23-year-old engineer and air
force officer, and started to live with him in Pune, Maharashtra, when
she was 19. By then she had completed her school education and a
two-year Intermediate course at college. She had also been offered a
place in medical college, but did not take it up. Neither Kamala nor
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her husband ever thought that she would go out to work, so training
as a doctor seemed pointless.
Karpagam was born in 1937 and brought up in Trichy; she married
Kamala’s brother, who became a company manager, when she was 12
and he was 19. Thus Karpagam’s marriage contravened the Sarda Act,
but any repercussions would have befallen her parents, not her father-
in-law, the doctor. Karpagam’s father was a liberal-minded writer,
whose mother apparently had modern views about girls’ education.
Before joining her husband, Karpagam was allowed to complete her
Secondary School Leaving Certificate. She won admission to a women’s
college in Chennai and her husband encouraged her to study there,
but Karpagam explained that she was nervous about her competence
in English. She does not regret missing college, as she has been happy
as a homemaker and would never have taken a paid job anyway.
Kalyani and Prema are the daughters of a wealthy Vattima who lived
in Kumbakonam. Kalyani was married in 1948 when she was 10 and
her husband, a future engineer and industrialist, was 15; their mar-
riage was consummated in 1954. Mainly because going to school was
easy in town, Kalyani continued until the tenth standard, although she
did not complete her Secondary School Leaving Certificate. Prema was
married in 1959 when she was 14 and her husband, also an engineer,
was 19; we are not sure whether Prema’s was a pre-puberty marriage.
Unlike Kalyani, Prema insisted on completing her Secondary School
Leaving Certificate and fought with her father to do so. Kalyani said
that her own education was strongly supported by her grandmother;
possibly, she intervened on Prema’s behalf. Prema wanted to go to
college as well, but her father refused permission, even though her
father-in-law, who was also her mother’s brother, supported her.
Mohambal, born in 1946, married Venkataraman, an engineer,
when she was 12 and he was 24. Mohambal went to her village school
and then to a high school in a nearby town to finish her Secondary
School Leaving Certificate, before moving to Chennai at 16 to join
her husband. Venkataraman had insisted on Mohambal completing
her education and made it a condition for agreeing to the marriage,
because he was sure that he wanted an educated wife. Venkataraman’s
father, a banker, was agnostic about Mohambal’s education, whereas
his mother opposed it, regarding it as demeaning. Mohambal’s own
father worried that her reputation might be damaged if she went
to school, with the result that she would be stuck in his house after
her husband and the rest of the Vattimas rejected her. However,
Venkataraman got his way.
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Dr Sundari, born in 1942, is the first Vattima woman doctor and
she practises in Chennai. Her father, a graduate, worked as a teacher
and a practitioner in Indian medicine, and he eventually became rich.
Sundari was brought up in Vishnupuram and attended its high school,
before completing her Pre-University course at a women’s college in
Trichy, where she stayed in its hostel. At this stage in her education,
said Sundari, her elder brother played a key role, because he was also
studying in Trichy and living in a boys’ hostel. Sundari demanded of
her father, ‘If he can study, why can’t I?’, and her father agreed. In
1958, she became a medical student in Chennai. Her father strongly
objected to pre-puberty marriage, which made him unpopular, but he
was ‘able to defy the village [because] the village needed him’ for his
medical skills. In her late twenties, Sundari married a man who does
not belong to her subcaste, so that her marriage was doubly unusual.
The most unconventional Vattima family we have come across was
headed by a high-ranking government official born around 1910. His
wife had only elementary education in her village. Their first daughter,
born around 1930, was married at 14, just after coming of age, and
had school education only. Their next child was a son, followed by
two more daughters who both went to college, strongly encouraged
by their father. The youngest daughter, born around 1940, graduated
from Madras University and later gained a doctorate in economics in
the United States, where she stayed to become a college professor. She
married a Tamil Brahman, but not a Vattima, who was a scientist.
For many decades, however, this family has had hardly any contact
with other Vattimas and our other informants never mentioned the
American professor and her sisters, whereas all the other educated
women described here are well-known figures.
After Dr Sundari—apart from the professor and her sisters—Vijaya
was probably the first Vattima woman to obtain a degree. Vijaya, born
in 1949, married a doctor when she was 17. Vijaya’s father, like her son
and several other family members, were or are doctors as well. Vijaya,
too, wanted to be a doctor, but in 1966 her father refused to let her go
to medical school because her new husband was a doctor, so they would
not need her income. He also objected to a science degree, but Vijaya
was eventually allowed to do an economics degree, partly because it
was not a ‘job-fetching’ subject. Whether Vijaya’s husband’s family
had any say in these decisions is unknown to us. By Vattima standards
in the 1960s, however, her father was quite progressive about female
education and post-puberty marriage, despite his conservative views
about working women.
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For these women born in the 1930s or 1940s, support from a
father, father-in-law or husband with unconventionally progressive
views about female education was critical, although a mother or
grandmother sometimes gave support as well, and one woman, Prema,
did stand up to her father. Some—but not all—of these men opposed
pre-puberty marriage too, but the key factor in their attitude towards
girls’ education was that they disapproved of secluding young wives
after menarche. Fathers and fathers-in-law had the authority to
enforce their will—Venkataraman could do so because he was already
an employed graduate aged 24 when he married. Often, though,
husbands were too young to have any say and several senior men
reported that they were never consulted about their wives’ education,
or indeed anything else related to their marriage. Thus Kalyani’s
husband told us that today he wishes he could have insisted that
Kalyani continue her education, but at 15 he was too young even to
think about it.
Family opposition to girls’ schooling, like that expressed by
Venkataraman’s mother, was not uncommon, even in later years. One
woman told us about her brother’s wife, who was married aged 10
in 1963 and reached menarche four years later. Her parents then
wanted to send her to live with her husband, a bank officer, but
he insisted that she should complete her Secondary School Leaving
Certificate. The girl’s parents asked her grandfather to intervene to
stop her education; when that failed, her mother set out to obstruct it
by making her daughter do domestic work late at night and keeping her
at home when she was menstruating. The girl retaliated by refusing
to eat during her periods until she was sent back to school and finally
triumphed by passing her Secondary School Leaving Certificate.
Victories of this kind were extremely rare, however. The great
majority of older women, reflecting on their own shortened education,
simply say that it never crossed their minds that things could have been
different and, in any case, girls in their day were never consulted about
anything that mattered to them. Instead, as we have seen, for the first
few Vattima women who completed their school education or went
to college, the critical decisions were made for them by their fathers,
fathers-in-law or husbands. These men were mainly influenced by their
own college education, their experience of urban life, and professional
employment, and their exposure in Chennai and other cities to the
more enlightened opinions of many non-Vattima Tamil Brahmans,
as well as other people. Even though the majority of well-educated
Vattima men still retained a conservative outlook, new ideas about
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female education and child marriage slowly percolated from the cities
through the whole Vattima community during the first two decades
after Independence.
Vattima girls’ education and the end of pre-puberty marriage
By the 1960s, pre-puberty marriage had not disappeared among
the Eighteen-Village Vattimas, but it was no longer so prevalent.
Few Vattima informants cited any specific reasons why the custom
was abandoned, but several mentioned the growing importance
of girls’ education and saw the two issues as interdependent,
as other Tamil Brahmans had done. Reflecting on the slow
spread of modernist discourse into her subcaste, Mahalakshmi in
Tippirajapuram attributed the demise of child marriage to the ‘force
of time’ (kalattin kattayam), a feeling that the custom’s time was over,
but she too had in mind the new need for girls to be properly educated.
That, she said, could not be left to affines; it had to be the parents’
responsibility.
Mahalakshmi’s remark is a telling one. Pre-puberty marriage and
good education for girls are not intrinsically incompatible, as long as
young wives can stay at school and college even after they come of age.
But since that was not allowed, the primary issue—as Mahalakshmi
saw—was not really pre-puberty marriage itself, but the control of girls
after menarche and responsibility for them. This was the true point of
contention when Venkataraman refused to allow Mohambal to be sent
to him as soon as she came of age, and instead insisted that his father-
in-law should ensure that she finished her schooling first. In effect,
since his marriage in 1958, Venkataraman’s attitude has come to
prevail. As a result, for Vattima girls born after about 1950, secondary
education—preferably completed with the Secondary School Leaving
Certificate—has increasingly been regarded as desirable and even
necessary before marriage, which in turn has ruled out pre-puberty
marriage and post-puberty seclusion. What changed, too, was that
parental responsibility for daughters, which was formerly transferred
to their husbands’ families when they came of age, was now prolonged
until each girl had completed her education and was deemed ready
for marriage, although growing sensitivity about abusive exploitation
of very young wives by their in-laws was probably a factor as well.
(Actually, Vattima women used to return to their parental homes for
unusually long periods after marriage, but that custom only partly
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protected them from abuse and did not undermine their in-laws’
authority over them.) Whether consciously aware of it or not, the
progressives who favoured better girls’ education were simultaneously
insisting that parents should care for their daughters for longer than
they had done when pre-puberty marriage was the norm. For Vattimas,
at least, the demand for improved female education foreclosed pre-
puberty marriage, whereas for other Tamil Brahmans who had
abandoned it earlier, it was the rising age of marriage for girls that
probably led to better education.39
Among Vattima women born in the 1950s or later, the majority have
had at least some secondary schooling and in the younger cohorts
most have finished their Secondary School Leaving Certificates or
even have a college degree. In Tippirajapuram, three out of five
women aged 49 or under completed secondary education, whereas
in the cities more than half have degrees and some young women also
have postgraduate degrees (see Tables 3 and 4). One major reason
for this difference is that women who married into urban families,
many of whom were also raised in cities, are generally better educated
than their village cousins and were thus more suitable partners for
urban, middle-class, professional men. An evolution in types of higher
education has occurred as well, which is discussed further below. The
majority of women appearing in Table 4 studied for general arts or
sometimes science degrees; for a commerce degree, which used to be a
popular choice; or for a teaching qualification, although four younger
women also have postgraduate degrees. Young women today, many
still unmarried so that they are excluded from Table 4, more often
study for specialized science or engineering degrees, and continuing
to higher degrees is fairly common.
Vattima women’s education and employment since the 1970s
In relation to women’s marriage and education, as well as employment,
there is no longer any noticeable divergence between the Eighteen-
Village Vattimas and other Tamil Brahmans who also belong to the
predominantly urban middle class. Thus Vattima women have caught
up, so to speak, with other Brahman women for whom child marriage
had ended a generation earlier, in the 1940s rather than the 1970s.
39 See Raman, Getting Girls to School, p. 253.
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Yet they have only fully caught up in the last 20 years or so; in other
words, among women who have become adult since around 1990,
there is no difference between Vattima and other Tamil Brahman
women, but in the preceding generation, Vattimas tend to be less well
educated and also less likely to be employed. An equally important
development is that among Vattimas and Tamil Brahmans in general,
male and female standards of education have been converging and in
the youngest generation, especially in cities, they are almost equal.
By the 1970s, completed family size was diminishing among middle-
class Tamil Brahmans. Moreover, the old preference for sons over
daughters has steadily faded away; certainly by the 1990s, few
Brahman parents—Vattimas or others—minded about it very much
and few have more than two children, even if both are girls. In relation
to their general welfare, as well as their education, girls and boys are
treated much more equally today than in the past.
In most people’s eyes, though, matrimonial considerations have
most powerfully driven rising standards of female education.
Venkataraman, who wanted Mohambal to finish at school in the1950s,
was unusual, but in the next decade and definitely by the 1970s, well-
educated Vattima men usually insisted on wives who had at least
completed their Secondary School Leaving Certificates. By the 1980s
or 1990s, they wanted wives who were graduates. In these respects,
Vattima men were like other middle-class Tamil Brahmans—and
countless other Indians throughout the country—who preferred
educated wives for the usual reasons: they would be more congenial
partners for the companionate marriages that were emerging as
the norm, as well as more competent mothers who could help with
their own children’s education. Educating daughters—initially to
Secondary School Leaving Certificate and later to degree standard—
therefore became a sound strategy for parents hoping to arrange good
marriages for them, although ‘over-educating’ girls caused problems,
because men generally preferred partners with qualifications below
their own. Moreover, whereas sons preferably studied vocational
subjects such as engineering, law, and accountancy—the paths to
well-paid, high-status professional jobs—daughters pursued general
arts, science or commerce degrees, precisely because marriageability,
not employment, mattered most.40 Indeed, as Vijaya’s case showed
above, vocational education for girls might be opposed because it was
40 Fuller and Narasimhan, ‘Companionate Marriage in India’, pp. 745–46.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 11 Jan 2013 IP address: 85.210.5.134
76 C . J . F U L L E R A N D H A R I P R I Y A N A R A S I M H A N
considered unsuitable for a married woman who would not go out to
work.
Medicine, an esteemed profession always open to both sexes, is
an exception to these generalizations about female education and
employment, although only a relatively small number of Tamil
Brahman women have ever been doctors. In recent decades, too,
medicine has become less attractive in practice for Brahmans in
South India, mainly owing to the reservations policy. As operated
in Tamilnadu, this policy—India’s version of ‘affirmative action’—
reserves more than half the places in government medical colleges
for lower-caste students, so that there is ferocious competition for
the ‘open seats’ for which Brahmans can apply. Most applicants are
therefore disappointed and very few families can afford the high fees
at private medical colleges.
Despite rising standards of education, until recently Vattima women
rarely took paid employment outside the home. Men consistently
opposed it, women rarely disagreed with them, and Vattimas were
mostly well-off enough not to need two incomes. Apart from Dr
Sundari and the American professor mentioned above, both unusual
exceptions, the first employed Vattima woman was probably Sita, a
bank officer in Bangalore, who was born in1955. Sita was brought up in
Calcutta, where she finished her Secondary School Leaving Certificate
before going to a women’s college in Trichy to study for a degree in
mathematics, an unusual degree for a woman in her day. Immediately
after graduation in 1976, Sita married and moved to Bangalore, where
she soon got a job in a bank. She was encouraged to do so by her
husband and his parents, and says that other Vattima women did not
criticize her. This may partly have been because Bangalore, as Sita
also observed, was and is a much less conservative place than Chennai
or anywhere else in Tamilnadu. The same characterization applies
to Mumbai, where we met two Vattima working women born in the
1960s; one is a qualified teacher, who actually started to work when
her only daughter was a child, and the other, who has a commerce
degree, worked in a private company until she got married.
Even compared with slightly younger Vattimas, especially in
Tamilnadu, Sita and the two Mumbai women remain unusual. Gita,
born in 1970, who was brought up in Chennai, is more typical. Gita
graduated with a commerce degree from a Chennai women’s college
in 1990 and was married immediately afterwards. She had wanted to
postpone her marriage to study for a Master’s degree, but that was
not allowed and after her wedding she soon became pregnant. Gita,
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however, had only wanted to study for longer and, unlike some of her
non-Vattima Brahman friends at college, she never desired a paid job.
Gita’s comment about her friends was echoed by other Vattima
women, but solid evidence about education and employment among
the generality of Tamil Brahman women is sparse. Our research in
Chennai in 2003–2005 included interviews with seven middle-class
Tamil Brahman women then aged 40–59 and three others aged
20–39. All seven older women have degrees and three also have
teaching qualifications; two of the younger woman have degrees,
but the third only completed the Pre-University course. Unlike their
Vattima contemporaries, most of these Brahman women, even after
marriage, worked as teachers or in banks and insurance company
offices. On the other hand, Patricia Caplan’s research in Chennai
in the mid-1970s among upper-middle-class women, many of them
Brahmans, revealed considerable resistance to female employment at
that time. As well as working with women who stayed at home, Caplan
studied an exceptional minority of senior professional women and
described the difficulties they faced in deviating from the ideal norm
of a non-working wife and mother. For the majority, Caplan found,
‘employment outside the home is not considered at all desirable’ and
most of those ‘who are now housewives in their thirties and forties
have never worked, and never really contemplated doing so’.41 She
also reported that most younger women had degrees and married
immediately after leaving college, which is consistent with Srinivas’s
observation from the same period that colleges were ‘respectable
waiting places’ for single girls and that—among higher caste, middle-
class people—a degree had by then become ‘essential for obtaining a
“good” groom’.42
Inadequate data preclude definite conclusions being drawn about
female employment trends, but the balance of evidence suggests that,
for the majority of middle-class Tamil Brahman women—but not
Vattimas—going out to work probably became acceptable—though
not necessarily desirable—by the 1980s. In almost all cases then
and now, however, working women firmly put their families’ interests
before their careers, and only work when their children are young if
41 Patricia Caplan, Class and Gender in India: Women and Their Organizations in a South
Indian City (London: Tavistock, 1985), p. 85.
42 M. N. Srinivas, ‘The Changing Position of Indian Women’, Man (n.s.), 12 (2)
1977, pp. 221–38, especially p. 234.
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they can rely on childcare provided by other family members, normally
mothers or mothers-in-law.
Engineering, IT and contemporary change
More recently, especially since the early 1990s, middle-class Tamil
Brahman attitudes towards female education and employment have
evolved further, so that many more women now than in the past see
higher education as a path to professional employment. This is partly
because young women brought up as equal to their brothers and as
well educated as them, or nearly so, are much less inclined than their
mothers were to confine themselves to motherhood and domesticity.
These young women actively want to work and in this ambition they
are often supported, or at least not opposed, by their parents. Many
older women, though not all, positively encourage their daughters and
granddaughters to take up opportunities that they missed out on. Some
older people disapprove of young women’s assertiveness, especially
when they drag their feet about getting married, but everyone agrees
that a marked change has occurred.
For example, a non-Vattima Brahman woman in her forties who lives
in Chennai was discussing her two daughters’ education and stated
that the decisions made by her and her husband would have been the
same had they had sons. Both daughters studied maths, science, and
computing; the elder, 20 at the time of the interview in 2004, was then
an engineering student who also wanted to carry on to an MBA. When
she finished at college in the 1980s, our informant said, most women
graduated ‘for the sake of it’, not for job and career reasons, but now,
like her own elder daughter, ‘girls know what they’re doing’. Gita’s
daughter is another such girl; in 2009, she became the first Vattima
girl to enter the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology in Chennai
and she intends to work after graduating, probably in IT. Like many
other students from the Institute, female or male, she also wants to
study for a further degree, probably an MBA, either in India or abroad.
Gita’s daughter’s admission to the Institute makes her exceptional,
but her attitude to further study and employment is typical of young
middle-class Tamil Brahman women.
IT has been critical in altering young women’s perceptions. Since
the mid-1980s, numerous private professional colleges, especially
engineering colleges, have opened in Tamilnadu. In private colleges,
unlike government colleges, the reservations system does not apply to
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all the places, so that it is easier for Brahmans to gain admission,
which is one important reason why engineering has become so
popular among them. The fees charged by private engineering colleges
(unlike medical colleges) are also affordable for many middle-class
families. Since the Indian government’s economic liberalization policy
started in earnest in 1991, private-sector employment has rapidly
expanded in urban South India, especially in service industries,
including IT, whose demand for personnel has in turn stimulated the
growth in engineering colleges. Some of these colleges provide high-
quality education—though others do not—and graduates from the top
colleges are recruited in large numbers by India’s leading software
and services companies, as well as other IT firms, based in Chennai,
Bangalore, Hyderabad, and some other Indian cities. In India today, IT
recruits many more graduate engineers than the manufacturing and
construction industries that previously provided most of the jobs.43
Particularly salient in relation to gender are the differences between
IT companies and older, ‘core’ engineering ones. Based on her
research in the late 1980s, partly with students at the Indian
Institute of Technology-Madras, Mukhopadhyay commented on the
overwhelmingly male environment of engineering departments, as
well as the working conditions in manufacturing and construction,
where engineers regularly work in dirty factories or on outdoor sites
alongside gangs of low-status, male manual workers. As a result,
in comparison with other sciences or medicine, for girls the ‘most
socially dangerous field by far is engineering’ and most parents actively
steered their daughters away from it, thus further reinforcing male
dominance over the profession.44 The IT sector is completely different
and, especially in the major software companies, the ‘clean’ work is
done alongside colleagues in city offices, so that it is seen as much safer
and more suitable work for women than conventional engineering,
despite the late working hours sometimes required. As the IT sector
has expanded, it has encouraged growing numbers of girls to study
engineering. The majority of engineering students are still male, but
there is a sizeable minority of young women in the colleges who can
of course compete for the same IT jobs. By 2008, about one-third
43 C. J. Fuller and Haripriya Narasimhan, ‘Engineering Colleges, “Exposure” and
Information Technology Professionals in Tamil Nadu’, Economic and Political Weekly,
41 (3) 2006, pp. 258–62.
44 Carol C. Mukhopadhyay, ‘Family Structure and Indian Women’s Participation
in Science and Engineering’, in Mukhopadhyay and Seymour (eds), Women, Education,
and Family Structure in India, pp. 114–16.
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of professional staff in the leading IT companies were women and
the proportion has been steadily rising.45 IT has radically altered
the attitudes towards engineering described by Mukhopadhyay, so
that by the start of the twenty-first century, girls could—and did—
increasingly compete on equal terms with boys in training for one of
modern India’s highest-status professions.
Although the majority of IT professionals are non-Brahmans,
Brahmans are disproportionately well represented in South India’s
IT companies, particularly in Chennai and Bangalore. Employment in
IT, especially in leading software firms, has now become the ambition
of many young women, as well as men, among Vattimas and Tamil
Brahmans in general. It is true that many Brahman men want to marry
‘home-loving’ partners and object to their wives going out to work. Yet
in the middle class, opposition to working wives is probably less among
Brahmans than in most other castes and communities. Moreover,
women IT professionals, who typically find husbands in the same
industry, can normally be confident about their marriage prospects,
unlike the science and engineering graduates of 20 years ago.46 Like
other working women, IT professionals nearly always put their family
responsibilities ahead of their careers, and when children arrive they
often leave their jobs or take career breaks. Thus we have met only a
couple of older women in senior positions who have pursued full-time,
long-term careers and their number is likely to rise only slowly, at
least in Chennai. Inside the major IT companies, however, women
and men are treated equally in relation to recruitment, promotion,
salary levels, and so on, and both sexes recognize it. To be sure, the IT
sector’s creed of female ‘empowerment’ glosses over persisting gender
inequalities, for instance in relation to the social factors obstructing
women’s promotion to senior positions.47 Nonetheless, even though it
45 A 2009 report from NASSCOM, the Indian IT businesses’ association, surveys
the position of women in the IT and Business Process Outsourcing sector, noting their
rising proportion in the professional workforce, including its technical sections, as well
as the obstacles facing them, especially in promotion to senior posts. See ‘NASSCOM-
Mercer Gender Inclusivity Report’, accessed from ‘Diversity and Inclusivity Initia-
tive’: <http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/LandingPage.aspx?id=52752>,
[accessed 17 December 2010].
46 See Mukhopadhyay and Seymour (eds), Women, Education, and Family Structure in
India, pp. 118–20.
47 Carol Upadhya and A. R. Vasavi, ‘Outposts of the Global Information Economy:
Work and Workers in India’s Outsourcing Industry’, in Carol Upadhya and A. R.
Vasavi (eds), In an Outpost of the Global Economy: Work and Workers in India’s Information
Technology Industry (New Delhi: Routledge, 2008), pp. 34–35.
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may sometimes be more rhetorical than real, gender equality at work
means a lot to the women IT professionals we have talked to, because it
affords them a degree of personal autonomy and social empowerment
that most other Indian women rarely enjoy.48
Obviously, IT companies alone will not revolutionize gender
relations. Certainly, too, however rapidly the IT industry grows, most
Tamil Brahman women will not study engineering and become IT
professionals—and even fewer will become high-flying scientists or
technologists, business consultants or company executives. Yet these
sorts of careers are now pursued by some young women. Moreover, they
are no longer beyond the imagination of girls, or their parents who give
them support, and nowadays a high proportion of young women are
determined to take up professional employment and start a career,
even if they give it up later when they have children. That change
in perspective has been strongly encouraged by today’s female IT
professionals, because they have become role models for many young
women—especially among middle-class Tamil Brahmans, including
Vattimas—who can now see opportunities for themselves that scarcely
existed 20 years ago.
Conclusion
Before ending with a general conclusion, we present one more
illustration of change within a Vattima family. Uma, who was born
in 1936 and completed the ninth standard in Tippirajapuram, was
mentioned above. Uma and her husband, a lawyer in Chennai for
15 years, had two sons and two daughters. The elder daughter, born
in 1958, married after she came of age at 15, during her final year
at school; she went to live with her husband, a bank officer, two years
later and in the meantime she completed her Pre-University course.
The couple live in Chennai and have two daughters. Uma’s younger
daughter, born in 1970, married at 21 after completing her commerce
degree; she and her husband, an engineer, live in Kerala and
have one son. The difference between Uma’s two daughters reflects
the changes that occurred between the 1970s, when finishing school
was more than enough for a typical Vattima girl married in her
48 C. J. Fuller and Haripriya Narasimhan, ‘Empowerment and Constraint: Women,
Work and the Family in Chennai’s Software Industry,’ in Upadhya and Vasavi (eds),
In an Outpost of the Global Economy, pp. 208–09.
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teenage years, and the 1980s, when girls started to obtain degrees to
improve their matrimonial prospects. In the next generation, women’s
educational qualifications moved steadily closer to men’s, as Uma’s
daughter’s daughters illustrate. Uma’s first granddaughter, born in
1978, has an engineering degree from BITS-Pilani, a technology
institute in North India and an MBA from a prestigious university in
California; unlike her forebears, she also has a job—in a multinational
auditing and consulting company in Los Angeles—and she married
a non-Vattima Brahman in 2006 when she was 28. The younger
granddaughter, born in 1984, studied for her Master’s in biomedical
genetics at Vellore Institute of Technology and then became a doctoral
student in Dallas. She married a Vattima at the age of 24 in
2008. The dramatic changes seen by Uma across five generations
in her family, from her probably illiterate grandmother to her
highly educated granddaughters, are actually quite common among
Vattimas, but she—like many of our older informants, female or
male—is still amazed when she reflects on how women’s lives have
been transformed.
It is true, of course, that huge improvements in female educational
standards have occurred in much of the world during the last century
or so. Over the same period, child marriage has also become far less
common, not only in India, but in numerous other countries as well. In
many respects, therefore, particularly in comparison with many of the
other upper castes now well represented in India’s educated middle
class, the Tamil Brahmans’ story is probably quite typical. Yet it is
facile to assume that it must be so when most scholarly work is confined
to unusual women and elite discourse on the ‘woman question’.49 One
of our main objectives has been to document how female marriage,
education, and employment are interrelated and how they have
changed among ordinary Tamil Brahmans, and we hope that similar
material will become more readily available for comparable groups.
Fortunately for our research, many senior Eighteen-Village Vattima
women—unlike all but the very oldest in other Tamil Brahman
groups—had personal experience of pre-puberty marriage. Hence we
have been able to discuss the disappearance of the custom in relation
to girls’ education with ethnographic data unavailable to historians
of colonial India working on similar questions, or indeed to most
49 See Kumar, The Politics of Gender, pp. 140–41.
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anthropologists studying other high-caste, middle-class groups which
used to practise child marriage.
We end with the relationship between caste and gender inequality.
In the early twentieth century, as had long been true, pre-puberty
marriage was a primary constitutive element of gender hierarchy
among Tamil Brahmans. It was also a powerful symbol of the
ritual purity and Sanskritic orthodoxy that enabled the Brahmans
to assert their social superiority over non-Brahmans. That is one
main reason why many Brahmans used to be so opposed to
marriage reform. Today, though, Tamil Brahmans rarely claim
superiority on traditional grounds of purity and orthodoxy. Of course,
non-Brahmans now unequivocally dismiss the notion of Brahman
superiority. Yet Brahmans themselves, within their own milieu, still
tend to reiterate it, mainly by reference to their putatively superior
intelligence and intellect, which are said to account for their high
standards of educational achievement and their success in the modern
professions, including most recently IT. But the caste’s educational
and professional success—as well as its modern ‘middle classness’—
are proven by the achievements of both sexes, so that whereas caste
superiority was traditionally linked to women’s lowly status, the
modern idiom requires almost the opposite. For contemporary Tamil
Brahmans, caste values—and their own sense of superiority—remain
important, but they have been modified. As part of that modification,
many old ideas about female inferiority and subordination have been
given up in a manner indicating that caste inequality is more deeply
rooted than gender inequality.
That finding returns us to Mukhopadhyay and Seymour’s question
about whether the old patrifocal structure and ideology are being
undermined in groups like the Tamil Brahmans in which women
have made the greatest educational advances. Certainly, among the
majority of middle-class Tamil Brahmans, gender inequality has not
vanished as shown, for example, by the priority given to husbands’
careers over wives’ and the taken-for-granted domestic division of
labour or, to cite alternative examples, by continued observation of
menstrual pollution and strict control over female sexuality.50 On the
other hand, as we have seen, there is now gender parity in education
and women—even if they do not pursue long-term careers—can work
outside the home; they also, for instance, mostly make up their own
50 Haripriya Narasimhan, ‘Adjusting Distances: Menstrual Pollution among Tamil
Brahmans’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 45 (2) 2011, pp. 243–68.
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minds about how to observe menstrual pollution and have a full
say in their own marriage arrangements, which they never had in
the past.51 Even a complete examination of all the features making
up the patrifocal complex might not answer Mukhopadhyay and
Seymour’s question for Tamil Brahmans, but clearly there have been
some changes that partly subvert the complex and hence significantly
reduce gender inequality within this traditionally high-status caste.
Not surprisingly perhaps, the simple fact of the matter is that Tamil
Brahman men have more readily ceded status to Brahman women
than Brahmans together have to non-Brahmans. This suggests that
the ‘decline of the hierarchical aspects of caste and gender among the
middle classes’ observed by André Béteille has not occurred in the
parallel manner that he implies.52 Instead, among Tamil Brahmans,
it is the contrast that has developed between persisting ideas of caste
superiority and diminishing gender inequality in the modern era that
is most striking.
What is also crucial, finally, is how women themselves see things.
In our experience, all Tamil Brahman women, young and old, insist—
like Uma—on how much their position has changed over the last few
generations and how much more control they now have over their own
lives. That perception in itself is a veritable social reality not only
for women, but also for the men of their caste, who cannot assume
the superiority that Manu prescribed and their own ancestors took for
granted.
51 Fuller and Narasimhan, ‘Companionate Marriage in India’, pp. 746–47.
52 André Béteille, ‘The Social Character of the Indian Middle Class’, in Imtiaz
Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld (eds), Middle Class Values in India and Western Europe (New
Delhi: Social Science Press, 2003), p. 82.
